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Brain and BRame
STEPHEN

J.

MORSE*

l.

INTRODUCTION

The discovery of biological pathology that may be associated with criminal
behavior lures many people to treat the offender as purely a mechanism and the
offensive conduct as simply the movements of a biological organism. Because
mechanisms and their movements are not appropriate objects of moral and legal
blame, the inevitable conclusion seems to be that the offender should not be
held legally responsible. I suggest in contrast that abnormal biological causes of
behavior are not grounds per se to excuse. Causation is not an excuse and , even
within a more sophistic ated theory of excuse, pathology will usually play a
limited role in supporting an individual excuse.
Parts II and III of this essay describe the law's concept of the person and its
relation to moral and legal responsibility and excusing conditions. Part IV then
examines why causation in general, even pathological causation, is not itself an
excusing condition. Next, Part V turns to the specific relation of brain or other
nervous system pathology to moral and legal responsibility properly understood. Finally, to illustrate the essay 's theses, Part VI considers in detail the case
of "Spyder Cystkopf," a man with a previously blameless history and a
confirmed cyst that impinged on his brain , who killed hi s wife during a heated
argument with her. 1

II.

THE LAw's C oNCEPT OF THE P ERSON

Intentional human conduct, that is, action , unlike other phenomena, can be
explained by physical causes and by reasons fo r action. Although physical
causes ex <ol ain the movements of galaxies and -planets, molecules, infrahum an
species, and a11 the other moving parts of the physical universe, including the
neurophysiological events accompanying hum an action, only human action can
also be exp lained by reas ons. It makes no sense to ask a bull that gores a
matador, "Why did yo u do that?," but this question makes sense and is vitally
~

* Ferdi nand Wake man Hubbe ll Profes sor, University of Pennsylvania Law SchooL and Professor of
Psychology and Law in Psychiatry, Unive rsity of Pennsylvania School of Medicine.
Th is essay was presented at th e Georg etown University Law Center Fac ulty Wo rksh op and at a pa ne l
on ·'Ne uropsychiatry in the Courtroom .. at the 1995 annual meet ing o f the American Ne uropsychiatric
Associati o n. I thank participants at both presentation s, and espec iall y Gregg Bloche, Larry Gostin.
Helen Mayberg. Jo hn Monahan , Norm an Relkin, and Richard Restak for helpful comme nts. In
modified form, the ess ay will also appear in Se111in ors in Clinical NeumpsychiMrr.
l. The fact s of the Spyder Cysrkopf case a re d rawn fro m Daniel A . Martell , Ne11· York 1'. Spw/cr
CYstkopf (unpubli shed manusc ript , o n file with Th e Georgetm\"11 Lmt· Jou rnal ). Although the Cys tk o pf
case is re aL th e na mes of th e defe nd ant and his v ictim are Dr. Martell ' s pseudonym s. The name~ and
cla ims of the ex perts arc real. Dr. Martel l' s descript io n of th e Cys tkopf case wi ll be publi shed in a
fo rth comi ng issue of Seminars in Clinical NeuropsYchiurrr.
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important when it is addressed to a person who sticks a knife into the chest of
another human being. It makes a great difference to us if the knife-wielder is a
surgeon who is cutting with the patient's consent or a person who is enraged at
the victim and intends to kill him .
When one asks about human action, "Why did she do that?," two di stinct
types of answers may be given. The reason-giving explanation accounts for
human behavior as a product of intentions that arise from the desires and beliefs
of the agent. The second type of explanation treats human behavior as simply
one bit of the phenomena of the universe, subject to the same natural, physical
laws that explain all phenomena. Suppose, for example, we wish to explain why
Molly became a lawyer. The reason-giving explanation might be that she wishes
to emulate her admired mother, a prominent lawyer, and Molly believes that the
best way to do so is also to become a lawyer. If we want to account for why
Molly chose one law school rather than another, a perfectly satisfactory explanation under the circumstances would be that Molly chose the best school that
admitted her.
The mechanistic type of explanation would approach these questions quite
differently. For example, those who believe that mind can ultimately be reduced
to the biophysical workings of the brain and nervo us system-the eliminative
materialists-also believe that Molly's "decision" is solely the law-governed
product of biophys ical causes. Her desires, beliefs, intentions, and choices are
therefore simply epiphenomenal, rather than genuine causes of her behavior.
According to this mode of explanation, Molly's "choices" to go to law schoo l
and to become a lawyer (and all other human behavior) are causally indistinguishable from any other ph enomena in the universe, including the movements of
molecules and bacteria.
As clinical and ex perimental sciences of behavior, psychiatry and psychology
are uncomfortably wedged between the reason-giving and mechanistic accounts
of human conduct. Sometimes they treat ac tion s as purely physical phenomena,
sometimes as texts to be interpreted, and sometimes as a combination of the
two. Even neuropsychiatry and neuropsychology, the more physical branches of
their parent disciplines, are similarl y wedged because they begin their investigations with action and not simply with abnorm al movements. One can attempt to
assimilate reason-giving to mech anistic ex planation by claiming that desires ,
beliefs, and intentions are genuine causes, and not simply rationalizati ons of
behavior. Indeed, folk psychology, the dominant explanatory mode in the soc ial
sciences, proceeds on the assumption that reasons for action are genuinely
causal. But the assimilationist position is phi losophically controversial, a controversy that will not be so lved until the mind-body probl em is "solved " 2 -an
event unlikely to occur in the foreseeable fut ure.
Law, unlike mechanistic explanation or the co nfEcted stance of psyc hiatry
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and psychology, views human action as almost entirely reason-governed . The
law 's concept of a person is a practical reasoning, rule-following being, most of
whose legally relevant movements must be understood in terms of beliefs,
desires , and intentions. As a sy stem of rules to guide and govern human
interaction-legislatures and courts do not decide what rules infrahuman species must follow-the law presupposes that people use legal rules as premises
in the practical syllogisms that guide much human action. No "instinct" governs how fast a person drives on the open highway. But among the various
explanatory variables, the posted speed limit and the belief in the probability of
paying the consequences for exceeding it surely play a large role in the driver's
choice of speed. For the law, then, a person is a practical reasoner, a being
whose action may be guided by reasons. The legal view of the person is not that
all people always reason and behave consistently rationally according to some
preordained, normative notion of rationality. It is simply that people are creatures who act for and consistently with their reaso ns for action and are generally
capable of minimal rationality according to mostly conventional, socially constructed standards.
On occasion, the law appears concerned with a mechanistic causal account of
conduct. For example, claims of legal insanity are usu ally supported and
explained by using mental disorder as a variable that at least in part caused the
defendant's offense. Even in such cases, however, the search for a causal
account is triggered by the untoward, crazy reasons that motivated the defendant. Furthermore, th e criteria for legal insanity primarily address the defendant's reasoning, rather than mechanistic causes. For example, in addition to a
finding of mental di sorder, acquittal by reason of insanity requires that the
defendant did not know right from wrong or was unable to appreciate the
wrongfulness of her act. Conduct motivated by crazy re asons is intentional
human action. The law excuses a legally insane defendant, ho wever, because
her practical reasoning was nonculpably inational , not because her behavior
was caused by abnormal psychological or biological variables. Indeed, it is a
simple matter to devise irrati onali ty criteria for legal insanity that would excu se
all people now found legally insane , but which make no mention whatsoever of
mental disorder or other allege d mec hanistic causes .

III.

REASONS , RESPONS IBIUT Y, AN D EXCUSES

The law's concepti on of respon sibility fo ll ows logically from its conception
of the person and the nature of law itself. O nce again, law is a sys tem of rules
that guides and govern s human interaction. It tell s citizens what they ma y and
may not do , what they must or must not do, and what they are entitled to. If
human beings were not creatures who coul d understand and follow the rules of
their society, who could not be guid ed by reasons , the law and all other sy stems ,
such as morality, that r·cgulate conduct by reasons and rules wo uld be powerless
to affect human action. R ule-fo llo wers must be creatures who are capable of
properly using the rules as premises in practical reasonmg. It follows that a
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legally responsible agent is a person who is so capable according to some
contingent, normative notion of both rationality itself and how much capability
is required. For example, legal responsibility might require the capacity to
understand the reason for an applicable rul e, as well as the rule's narrow
behavior command. These are matters of moral, political, and, ultimately, legal
judgment, about which reasonable people can and do differ. There is no
uncontroversial definition of rationality or of what kind and how much is
required for responsibility. But the debate is about human action-intentional
behavior guided by reasons.
Specific legal responsibility criteria exemplify the foregoing analysis. Consider the criminal law and criminal responsibility. Most substantive criminal
laws prohibit harmful conduct. Fair and effective criminal law requires that
citi zens must understand what conduct is prohibited, the nature of their own
conduct, and the consequences for doing what the law prohibits. Homicide
law s, for example, require that citizens understand that unjustifiably killing
other human beings is prohibited, what counts as killing conduct, and that the
state will inflict pain if the rule is viol ated and the perpetrator is caught and
convicted . A person incapabl e of unders tanding the rule or the nature of her own
conduct, including the context in which it is embedded, could not properl y use
the rule to guide her conduct. For ex ample, a person who delusionally believed
that she was about to be killed by another person and kills the other in the
mistaken belief that she must do so to save her own life, does not ration ally
understand what she is doing. She of course knows that she is killing a human
being and does so intention all y, but the rule agai nst unjustifiable homicide wi ll
be ineffective because she delusionally believes that her action is justifiable.
The inability to foll ow a rule properly, to be rationally guided by it, is what
distinguishes the delu sional age nt from peopl e who are simply mi staken , but
who could have fo llowed rhe rule by exerting more effort, attention, or the like.
We believe that the delusional person' s failure to understand is not her fa ult
because she lacked the abili ty to understand in thi s context. In contrast, the
person capable of ra tional co nduct is at fault if she fa ils to exercise her
rationality. In sum, rationali ty is requi red for responsibility, and nonculpable
inationality is an excusi ng condition. Blaming and pu nishin g an irrati onal agent
for violating a rule she was incapable of following is unfair an d an ine±Tecti ve
mechani sm of social control.
Res pon sibility also requires th at the agent act without compulsion or coercion, even if the agent is full y rational , because it is also unfair to hold people
accountable for behavior that is wrongly compelled. For example, suppo se a
gun slinger threatens to kill you un less you kill another innocent perso n. The
bal ance of evils is not positive : it is one in nocent life or another, so the killi ng
would not be justified. But it might be excused because it is compelled.
Compul sion in volves a wrongful hard choice that a ratio nal, otherwise responsible agent faces. If she yields to the threat, it will not be because she doesn't
understand the legal rule or what she is doin g. She knows it is wron g and acts
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intentionally precisely to avoid the threatened harm . Still, society, acting through
its legal rules governing such cases, might decide that some choices are too hard
fairly to expect the agent to behave properly and that people will be excused for
making the wrong choice. If the hard choice renders the person irrational and
incapable of rationality, then there is no need to resort to notions of compulsion
to excuse.
In sum, an agent is responsible for a particul ar action if she was capable of
rationality and acted without compulsion in this context. If she was incapable of
rationality or compelled to perform the particular action, she will be excused.

IV.

CAUSATION

Is

NOT AN EXCUS ING COND ITIO N

The "fundamental psycholegal error" is the mistaken belief that if science or
common sense identifies a cause for human action, including mental or physical
disorders, then the conduct is necessarily excused. But causation is neither an
excu se per se nor the equivalent of compulsion, which is an excusing condition.
For example, suppose that I politely ask the brown- haired members of an
audience of lawyers to whom I am speaking to raise their hands to assist me
with a demonstration. As I know from experience, virtually all the brunet(te)s
will raise their hands, and I will than k them politely. These hand-raisings are
clearly caused by a variety of variables over which the brunet(te) attorneys have
no control, inclu d ing genetic endowment (being brunet(te) is a genetically
determined, but-for cause of the behavior) and , mos t proximately, my words.
Equally clearly, this conduct is human action-intentional bodily movementan d not simpl y the movements of bodily parts in space, as if, for example, a
neurological di sorder produced a simil ar arm -risin g. Moreov er, the conduct is
entire ly rational and uncompelled. The cooperating audience members reaso nably desire that the partic ular lecture they are attending should be useful to
them. They reasonably believe that cooperating with the invited lecturer at a
profession al meeting will help sati sfy that desire. Thus, they form the intention
to raise their hands, and they do so. It is hard to imagine more completely
ration al conduct, according to any normative notion of rationality. The handraisings were not compelled, because the audience was not threatened with any
untoward consequen ces whatsoever for failure to cooperate. In fact, the lecturer 's request to participate was more like an offer, an opportunity to make
oneself better off by impro ving the presentat ion's effectiveness, and offers
provide easy choices and more freedo m, rather than hard choi ces and less
freedo m.3
T he cooperati ve audience members are clearly responsible for their handrais ings and fu lly desen;e my "thank you ," even thoug h their conduct was
perfectly predictab le and every bit as caused as a neuropathol ogically induced
arm-rising. My '' thank you" was not intended simply as a positive rei nforcer fo r
3. See A L AN \VERTH EI MER, C OERCI ON 204- 11 ( 1987 ) (distinguishing threats fro m offers and discu ssing ditlere nt me thods of setting baselines to ma ke the di stincti on).
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the hand-raising behavior the audience members performed. Gratitude is the
appropriate moral sentiment in response to the willingness of the audience to
satisfy the normatively justifiable expectation th at they should cooperate and the
reasonable assumption that a group of lawyers is composed of rational and
therefore responsible moral agents. "Thank you" is the appropriate and de4
served expression of that moral sentiment. Although the hand-raising conduct
is caused, there is no reason why it should be excused.
All phenomena of the universe are presumably caused by the necessary and
sufficient conditions that produce them. If cau sation were an excuse, no one
wo uld be responsible for any conduct, and society would not be concerned with
moral and legal responsibility and excuse. Indeed , eliminative materialists,
among others, often make such assertions, 5 but such a moral and legal world is
not the one we have, nor I daresay, one that most of us wo uld prefer to inhabit.
Although neuropathologically induced arm-risin gs and cooperative, intentional
hand-rai sings are equally caused, they are distin guishabl e phenomena, and the
difference is vital to our conception of oursel ves as human beings. This is not
the appropriate place to offer a defense of the importance of responsibility and
excuse and praise and blame, but I will simply ass ume that such human ideas
and practices enrich our lives and encourage human flouri shing. 6 In a moral and
legal world that encompasses both responsible and excu sed action , all of which
is caused, the di screte excusing conditions that should and do negate responsibility are surely caused by somethin g. Nevertheless, it is the nature of the exc using
condition that is doing the work, not that the excu sing condition is caused.
The determini st reductio-everyone or no one is responsible if the tru th of
determinism or universal causation underwrites responsibility-is often attac ked in two ways. The first is "selective determinis m" or " selective causation " -the claims that onl y some beha vior is caused or determin ed and that
on ly thi s subset of behav ior should be exc used. T he metaphysic s of selective

-+. I am bon·owing here from J<:~ y W<:~liac e ·s excell ent. compat ibilist <:~ccount of what it m e<:~ns to hold
so meone respon sible. According to Wall ace . holding people moral ly responsible cannot be reduced to a
behavioral di sposi tion positi vely and negative ly to reinforce good and bad co nduct. respecti ve ly. It is a
susce ptibility to experi ence the appropri ate moral se nti ments if another age nt meets or breaches a
justifiabl e moral obligation that one accepts and then w express these emot ions throu gh the app ropriate
positive or negati ve practices, such as praise and blame. See R . .!A Y WALL.->.CE. RESP00iS IBILITY .->.r-< D TH E
MORAL Si:NTIMENTS 51 -83 ( 1994).
One can imagine a wo rld in which praise and blam e were use d solel y for their operant cond itionin g
su<.:cess. but I suspe<.: t th<1t they would then be quite unsu ccess ful. and the world wo uld be a quite
<.:hecrl ess place in general.
5. For ~1th o ughtful acco unt of eliminati ve m;neriali sm's imp!icu.tions for criminal law and responsibil ity. see Andrew E. Lelling. Eliminative /V[Oi eriali.\111. Neuroscience und th e Criminal La11·. 141 U. P.-\ . L.
R ~-:v . 1471 ( 1993 ). For a more wide- ranging. re ce nt exp lorati on o f elimi nati ve materi ali s m. see P . \UL M.
CHURCHI.A:-.iD, T HE E~:G I:'i E OF REASON , THE SE.\T OF THE S: ouL: A PHI LOSOPHICAL JOURNE Y INTO TH F
BR.-\iN ( 1995 ). Churchland bri efly ex plores the moral and leg al imp I icati ons. Se e id. at 309-1.:1-.
6. Se e W.-\LL/\C E. supra note 4 , at 69 (claiming that such prac tices demonstrate ··our co mmitment to
ce rtain moral stanclarcls , as regu lative of soc ial life.·· and m~• k c c; ' ·perh aps irrepla<.:eable con tributi on
.. to the constituti on and maintenance of moral communit ies·· ).
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causation are wildly implausible and "panicky," 7 however. If this is a causal
universe, as it most assuredly is, then it strains the imagination also to believe
that some human behavior somehow exits the "causal stream." To explain in
detail why selective causation/selective excuse is an unconvincing and ultimately patronizing argument would require a lengthy digression from this
essay's primary purpose. I have made this argument in detail elsewhere and
shall simply assert here that good arguments do not support this position. 8
The second attack on the determinist reductio claims that only abnormal
causes, including psychopathological and physiopathological variables, excuse.
Although this argument appears closer to the truth, it is a variant of selective
determinism and suffers from the defects of that approach. Pathology can
produce an excusing condition, but when it does it is the excusing condition that
does the work, not the existence of a pathological cause per se. Consider again
the delusional self-defender, who kills in response to the delusionally mistaken
belief that she is about to be killed. Human action to save one's life is not a
mechanistic , literally irresistible cause of behavior, and crazy beliefs are no
more compelling than noncrazy beliefs. The killing is perfectly intentional-the
delusional belief provides the precise reason to form the intention to kill.
Moreover, the killing is al so not compelled simply because the belief is pathologically produced. A nondelusional but unreasonably mistaken self-defender, who
fee ls the same desire to save her own life, would have no excuse for killing . A
desire to save one 's own life furnishes an excu sing condition only under very
limited circumstances. There is also nothing wrong with our defender's "will,"
properly understood as an intentional executory state that translates desires and
beliefs into action. 9 The defender's will operated quite effe ctively to effectuate
her desire to live when she believed that she needed to kill to survive. Nor does
o ur delusional self-defender lack " free will " simply because she is abnormal. I
don't know what free will is in any case, and it is oft en just a placeholder for the
co nclusion that th e agent supposedly lacking thi s desirable attribute ought to be
exc used. T he real reason our delu sional self-defender ou ght to be excused, of
co urse, is that she is not capable of rationality on this occasion . This is the
genuin e ex cusing condition that distingui shes her from the nondelusional but
unreason ably mi staken se lf-defender.
When agents behave inexplicably irrationaliy, we frequently believe that
underlying path ology produces the inationality, but it is the irrationality, not the

7. Peter Strawson , Freedom and Resen ltn enl, in F REE 'vV!l.L 59, SO (Gary Watson ed .. 1982) .
St rawson uses the term ··panick y"" to desc ri be libertari an metaph ysics ge nerall y. bu t it appli es equall y
we ll in this context. The sekcti ve cletermini sc"s belief that oni y the small subset of people who are
alle gedl y de termined shouid be exc used enta ils the corresponding beli ef that the majority of people
who are held respo nsible have li bertari<ln . contracausa l freedom.
8. For the full argument, see Ste phen J. Mo rse. Psr chologr. D:!le nn inism ond Lega l Responsibi!ilT ,
in THE L A W .".S .\ BEI-!.WIORAL I NSTR UMENT 35.50-54 (Gary 8. Melton cd .. l lJ8 6).
9. S!!e MI CH.". EL S. MOORE. A CT Ai'; D CRI~·I E : TH E P ii !LOSO PHY OF ACT ION AN D ITS I M PLIC ATI ONS FOR
CR i ~li:~ . \ L LAw I i 3-oS ( 1993) (p rov iding a comple te acco un t and defen se of the cla im th at the will is an
inte ntional c.xecutory state).
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pathology, that excuses. After all, pathology does not always produce an
excusing condition, and when it does not, there is no reason to excuse the
resultant conduct. To see why, imagine a case in which pathology is a but-for
cause of rational behavior. Consider a person with paranoid fears for her
personal safety, who is therefore hypervigilant to cues of impending danger.
Suppose on a gi ven occasion she accurately perceives such a cue and kills
properly to save her life. If she had not been pathologically hypervigilant, she
would have missed the cue and been killed . She is perfectly responsible for this
rational, justifiable homicide. Or take the case of a hypomanic bu sinessperson,
whose manic energy and heightened powers are a but-for cause of making an
extremely shrewd deal. Assume that busin ess conditions later change unforeseeably and the deal is now a loser. The deal was surely rational and uncompelled
when it was made, and no sensible legal system would later void it because the
businessperson was incompetent to contract. Even when pathology is uncontroversially a but-for cause of behavior, th at conduct w ill be excused only if an
independent excusing condition, such as irrationality or compulsion, is present.
Even a hi ghl y abnormal cause will not excuse unless it produces an excusing
condition.

V.

BRAIN AN D BLAME

T he foregoing analysis of excusing conditions applies straightforwardly to
cases in which brain or nervou s system pat hol ogy is part of the causal chain of
intentional behavior. To begin, bi ological cau sation will only be part of the
causal determinants of any intentional conduct, which is always mediated by
one 's culture, language, and the like. The best acco unts of the rel ation between
brain and beha vior suggest that no discrete b it of physiology always and
everywhere produces exactl y the same intentional cond uct in all human beings
experiencing that physiological state, that no stimulus prod uces exactly the
same brain states in all people responding to it, and that no bit of exactly the
same behavi or emitted by different people is attended by exactly the same brain
state in all the similarly behaving agents. For example, the same pathophysi ological (or psychopathological) processes may produce delu sional beliefs in all
people with the processes, but the delusional content and resultant behavior of
delu sional, thi rteenth-century subcontinental Indians wi ll surel y differ from that
of delusional, late-twentieth-century Americans. For a second intu itive example,
con sider the demonstration about hand-raising disc ussed previously. 10 Large
numbers of people behave (approximate ly) exactl y the same for the same
reasons in response to the same stimulus. It is implausi ble to assume that their
brai ns and nervous systems are in identical biophysical states. In sum , biolog ical variables will rarely be the sole determi nants of intention al human action.
More funda mentally, biological causati on will not excuse per se, because

I 0. See supra text ::tccompan yi ng notes 3-4 .

1996]

BRAIN AND BLAME

535

people are biological creatures and biology is always part of the causal chain for
everything we do. If biological causation excused, no one wou ld be responsible.
Intentional human action and neuropathologically produced human movements
are both biologically driven, yet they are conceptually, morally, and legally
distinguishable. Moreover, if biology were "all" the explanation and everything
else, including causal reasons for action, were simply epiphenomenal-as the
eliminative materiali sts claim-then our entire notions of ourselves and responsibility would surely alter radically. But eliminative materialism is philosophically controversial, 11 and science furnishes no reason to believ e that it is true.
Indeed, it is not clear conceptually that science could demonstrate that it is true.
Thus , until the doctor comes and convinces us that our normati ve belief in
human agency and responsibility is itself pathological , biological causation per
se does not excuse.
Abnormal biological causation also does not excuse per se. Human acti on can
be rational or inational, uncompelled or compelled, whether its causes are
" normal" or "abnormal." Whatever the causes of human action may be, they
will ultimately be expressed through reasons for action, which are th e true
objects of responsibility analysis. Suppose, for example , that a confirmed brain
lesion, such as a tumor, is a but-for cause of behavior. That is, let us suppose
that a particular piece of undesirable behavior would not ha ve occuned if th e
agent never had the tumor. M ake the further, strong assumption that once the
tumor is removed, the probability that this agent will reoffend drops to zero .
Although one's strong intuition may be that thi s agent is not respon sible for the
undesirable behavior, the given assumptions do not entail the concl usion that
the agent should be excused. T he undesirable behavior is human action, not a
literall y irresistible mechanism, and the causal role of the brain tumor does not
necessarily mean that the behavior was inational or compelled.
Moreover, it is a mi stake to assume that specific brain pathology ine vi tab ly
produces highly spec ific, complex intenti onal act ion. Certain areas of the brain
do control general functions. For ex ample, Broca's area in the left frontal lobe
controls the ability to comprehend and produce appropriate language. A sufficient
lesion in this site produces and enables us to predict aphasi a. But there is no
region or site in the frontal lobes or anywhere else in the brain that control s
specific, complex intentional actions . No lesion enables us to explai n causall y or
to predict an age nt's reaso ns and consequent intentional action in the same
direct, prec ise way that a lesion in Broca's area permits the explanation or
predicti on of aphasia. Neurological lesions can dissociate bodil y movements
from apparent intentions, producing automatisms and simil ar " unconscious "
states . 11 But such states rarely produce criminal conduct, and when they do, th e
11. See Galen Strawson . Consciousn ess. Free Will. and the Unimponance of" Dnenninism. 32
3 (1989) (c laimin g that reducti ve phys icali sm abo ut the mind is ··moonshin e ·· ). See generollr
JOHN R. SEAR l.E. THE R ED ISCOVERY OF THE M IND ( 1992) (prov iding an exte nded argument for the
irreducibl e reality of mind ).
12. I th ank Norman R. Rei kin. M.D .. Ph.D., for makin g thi s point to me particular ly clearly.
I NQUIRY
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agent is exculpated. In these cases we need not even reach the iss ue of whether
the agent 's intentional action is rational, because action itself is lacking. 13 The
story relating brain or nervous system pathology to intentional conduct will be
far more complicated and far less direct than the already complic ated correspondence between brain and nervous system lesions and the reduction or los s of
general function s.
Brain or other nervous system pathology affects agents more generally.
Suppose, for example, that the tumor in the previous example m akes the agent
irritable or emotionally labile. Such emotional states surely make it harder for
any agent to fly straight in the face of other criminogenic variables, such as
provocati on or stres s, but per se they do not render an agent irrational. Other
agents may be equally irritable or labile as the resul t of environmental variables,
such as the loss of sleep and stress associated with, say, taking law exams or
trying an important, difficult, lengthy case. But these people would not be
excused if they offended while in an uncharacteristic emotional state, unless that
state sufficiently deprived them of rationality. People with criminogenically
predisposing congenital abnormalities or lifelong character traits would have
even less excuse for undesirable behavior, becau se they had the time and
experience to learn to deal with those aspects of themselves th at made fl ying
straight harder.
Co nsider the case of Charles Whitman, who killed man y victims by shooting
pas sersby from the top of the tower on the University of Texas campus. He
suffered from a brain tumor, and let us ass ume that we could demonstrate
incontrovertibly that he wo uld not have shot if he had not suffered from the
tumor. But whether he is no nethe less respons ible depe nds not o n the but-fo r
causation of hi s homi cides, but on his reasons for action. lf Whitman believ ed,
for example, that mas s murder of innocents wou ld produce eternal peace o n
earth, then he should be excused, whether the delusional belief was a product of
brain pathology, childhood traum a, or whatever. But if Whitman was simpl y an
angry perso n who believed that life had dealt him a raw de al and that he was
going to go out in a blaze of glory that would give his mi serable life meaning ,
then he is unfortun ate but responsibl e, whether hi s anger and beliefs were a
prod uct of the tumor, childhood trauma, an unfortunate character, or wha te ver.
A ll hu man action is, in part, the product of but-for causes over which agents
have no con trol and wh ich they are powe rless to change, including thei r genetic
endowments and the nature and context of their chilclrearin g. If people hac!
differe nt genes, different parents, and different cultures, they would be differen t.
Moreover, situational determinants over which agen ts have no con trol are
but- fo r causes of much behavior. A victim in the wrong place at the wro ng time
is as much a but-for cause of the mugging as the mugger 's genetic s and
ex periences . If no victim were availab le, no mugging occurs, whatever the

*

13. See. e.g .. M ODEL PE NA L CODE
2.0 l (2) (Proposed Ofti cia l Draft 1962) (stating tha t bodily
movements tha t arc un conscious arc not voluntary acts) .
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would-be mugger's intentions. Such considerations are treated by philosophers
under the rubric , "moral luck." 14 Our characters and our opp011unities are in
large measure the product of luck, and if luck excused, no one would be
responsible. A brain tumor or other neuropathology that enhances the probability of the sufferer engaging in antisocial behavior is surely an example of
dreadful bad luck. But unless the agent is inational or the behavior is compelled, there is no reason to excuse the agent simply because bad luck in the
form of biological pathology played a causal role . A cause is just a cause. It is
not per se an excuse.

VI.

"SPYDER CYSTKOPF"

Spyder Cystkopf was charged with second degree murder for killing hi s wife,
Brunhilda, on January 7, 1991. According to Cystkopf, he and Brunhilda had
been arguing about their chi ldren, and she bec ame enraged and scratched his
face. During the ensuing fight, he struck her a number of times, she fell to the
floor, and he strangled her to death. Cystkopf then arranged the crime scene to
make Brunhilda's death appear to be a suicide, including throwing her out the
thirteenth story window of their home. Forensic pathological evidence suggested that Brunhilda was perhaps alive when she hit the pavement. 15 Cystkopf
pled legal insanity and used evidence that he had a sub-arachnoid cyst! 6 to
claim that the normal functioning of hi s brain was impaired.
Cystkopf was a sixty-four year old "se mi-retired" advertising executive. He
had no previous history of violent conduct and no criminal record. In 1948 he
suffered from various neurological abnormalities , including migrai ne and what
was described as a sei zu re that caused disorientation, difficulty finding words .
and an :::tbnorrnal reflex. Medic al tests found nothing \Vrong of neurological
signific ance, and Cystkopf was discharged with a diagnosis of suspected congenital cerebral aneurism. ho m the 1948 discharge until the homicide in 1991 ,
Cystkopf suffered from no neurological problems or disorders.

14. See generallY MORA L LUCK (Daniel Stat man eel .. 1993) lco llect ing class ic arti c les ::Jdclress ing the

topic).
15. The cxplar.ati on for this rinding most sympathetic to Cystkopf is that Bmnhilda was only
unconsci ous from the strangling whe n Cystkopf defenestrated her, but he nonetheless bel ie ved that she
was de::Jcl. If thi s is true, criminal law buffs will immed iatel y recognize a neat c::Ju sation probl em. The
intentionally homicid::JI act-strangling- did not in fact cau se Brunhilda's death. The intenti onal act
tha t in fa ct killed Brunhilc!::J--dcfenestration- was on ly ne gl igent at most concerning death. So should
Cystkopf be charged with intentional homicide or with attempted homicide') See Thabo Me li v.
Reginam , I All E.R. 373 ( 1954) (holding th at when defendants mi st::Jkenly thought victim \Vas dead and
then kill ed victim by a second ::Jet, defendants were gu ilty of murder because the eve nts could not be
separated). For those who do not understand why results matter. this is al l beside the point. of course.
See . e.g .. Sanford H. Kadis h. Th e Sup reme Cou rr Re\·ie11·, Foreumd: Th e Criminal Law and !he Luck o(
!he Dmw. 84 J. (Rt;·.1. L. & CR 1\·11NOLOG Y 679 ( 1994) (arguing that re, ults have no bearing on an
offe nder \ cu lpability and that reducing punishment if h::Jrm does not re sult is irrati onal).
16. A sub-arachnoid cyst is a fluid -filled tissue sac just beneath the middle le ve l of the protective
linin gs that sunound the br::J in. The cyst is thus net wi thin the brain itself. Most such cysts arc probably
co ngenital. See Martell , supra note l. at i 3.
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As a person with far more resources than the average murder defendant,
Cystkopf was able to retain excellent private counsel and numerous experts. He
was evaluated psychiatrically, neurologically, and neuropsychologically. Virtually all the evaluations produced normal results, and none produced significant
abnormalities. Cystkopf also underwent various brain-imaging procedures, which
disclosed the presence of the sub-arachnoid cyst and significant, but possibly
artifactual, decreases in cerebral metabolism in regions of the brain adjacent to
the cyst. In light of these findings, Cystkopf's local experts referred him for
further evaluation to Dr. Antonio Damasio's well-known neurological and
cognitive neuroscience team at the University of Iowa College of M edicine. 17
Damasio's findings and theories were the crux of Cystkopf's legal insanity
claim. The size and location of the sub-arachnoid cyst were confirmed once
again. Neuropsychological testing indicated mild defects in "executive control"
functions, including prospective memory, sequential learning, and flexible responding to changing environmental contingencies. Most important, Damasio
found that Cystkopf's ability to "mark" appropriate behavioral response options
with a signal was impaired. Damasio had previously suggested and tested on a
small number of subjects the hypothesis that some adults with acquired frontal
lobe damage and sociopathic behavioral changes suffer an impairment in the
ability to "mark [the implications of social situatio ns] with a signal that would
automatically distinguish advantageous from pernicious actions, in the perspective of social rules and current contingencies." 18 Consequently, such people
allegedly have diminished ability to guide their conduct with appropriate responses, even if their ab ility cognitively to conjure up such responses is
unimpaired. 19 Because Cystkopf's performance on the experimental protocol
was similar to those of the brain-damaged experimental subjects in the earlier
study, Damasio concluded that Cystkopf suffered from "a pathological diminution of autonomic responses to highly charged social/affective stimuli, in a
nonverbal paradigm." 20 Damasio's final report noted that Cystkopf's responsekilling-and his wife's provocation were both unusual. Further, the report

17. For expositional ease. I shall henceforth refer to all findings and opinions as Dr. Damasio's.
although others at Iowa contributed to Cystkopf's multidisciplinary evaluations.
18. Antonio R. Damasio et a!.. Jndil •idua/s ll"ith Sociopathic Behavior Caused by Frontal Damage
Fail to Respond Autcmomicall\- to Social Stimuli. 41 BEHAVIOURAL BRAIN REs. 81. 82 ( 1990) [hereinafter Damasio et al., Individuals]. Damasio"s theory has been termed the '·somatic marker ·· theory. The
study used a sample of five experimental and six control subjects.
Damasio's wider goal is to provide a thoro ug hly biological account of how psychology is possible,
including subjectivity, the most notoriously dillicult psychological experience to explain. Damasio
presents a complete general account in ANTONIO DAiVIAS10. DESCARTES' ERROR: E\mTI00J. RE.\SO~ AND
THE HUMAN BRAIN ( 1994) Ihereinafter DML\SIO. DESC\RTES · ERROR]. The further testing of the somatic
marker theory is also discussed. !d. at ?.05-22.
19. !n Damasio ·s words: "Because they arc c!epri ved of a natural qualifying marker. they must
depend instead on a reasoned cost-benefit analysis of numerous and often conflictual options (involving
both immediate and future consequences). The adequacy and speed of response selection are degraded
accordingly ... Damasio eta!., !ndi\'iduals. supm note 18. at 82.
20. Martell, supra note 1, at 19.
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asse11ed: "It is reasonable to assume that his inability to respond correctly is
part of the same defect that so limits hi s emotional and psychophysiological
responses, and also that such a defect is due to his long-standing neurological
condition." 2 1
Armed with these findings and hypotheses about Cystkopf, the defense
claimed that Cystkopf's cyst had been inexorably growing, perhaps throughout
his life, and finally, in response to the alleged argument with and scratching by
his wife, Cystkopf was "unable to select the most appropriate response option "
because he had "pathological alterations in [his] modulation of social behavior." As a result, Cystkopf allegedly lacked substantial capacity to appreciate
the criminality of hi s actions. 22
Cystkopf was not raising a "standard" insanity defense, because he lacked a
diagnosis of major mental disorder and grossly psychotic symptoms. Both are
usually practically required to support an insanity defense, and the law sometimes requires the presence of severe mental disorder to raise the defense.
Nevertheless, I believe that Cystkopf raised a colorable insanity claim. No
diagnosis or symptoms necessarily entail that the agent is not legally responsible, as the American Psychiatric Association's official diagnostic manual
admits ? 3 The genuine basis for the excuse is noncu lpable inationality. Cystkopf
should be excused if he can demonstrate that the tumor (or anything else)
rendered him nonculpably irrational when he killed hi s wife, even if hi s mental
state does not fi t traditional definitions of major mental disorder. 24
Before addressing Cystkopf's moral and legal responsibility for killing hi s
wife, let us review what we reasonably believe, what we would like to know.
and what is speculative. We reasonably believe that ( 1) Cystkopf killed hi s wife
by either strangling or defenestrating her; (2) Cystkopf had no history either of
any vio lent co nd uct whatsoever or of any signs or symptoms of neurological
disorder since 1948; and (3) C ystkopf had a sub-arachnoid cyst that may have
decreased his cerebral metabolism in the region adj acent to the cyst. What we
would like to know is a very large category, but it includes at ieast the
fo llowing: (l) a detailed accou nt of exactly what the fight was about and what
was Cystkopf's mental state \V hen he attacked hi s wife; (2) a detail ed, intimate
21. !d. at 20.
22. Indeed. one defense psychi atri st opined that it was ··imposs ibl e·· for Cys tkopf to do so. M
23. AMERICAN PsYCHJATRIC Ass·N. DJAG'IOSTJC .-\ND STiHISTJCAL MANUAL or: MENTAL DJSORDERS at
x.x iii -xxiv. xxvii (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-lV !. See genera/h· Stephen J. Morse, Failed E'tplww ·
rions and Cri111inaf Re.\fJIJI/siiJi!itr: Experr.1 ond rile Unconsciou s, 68 VA . L. REV. 971, I 048 -50. I 059 -70
( 198 2) (arguing that diagnoses and sympto ms alone cannot dete rmine whether an agent is lega ll y
responsible) .
24. Cystkopf might have tried to grou nd his in sanity claim in a diagnosis of ·'episod ic clyscontrol. .,
Although not a part of the ofti cial d iagnostic nomenclature. !t is a diagnostic term that has bee n in
vog ue and is :;o metimes still used . For va rious reasons. howe ve r. the '·d iag nosis·· is unsati sfactory. See
Philip Lucas. Episodic DYsconrml: ,-\ Loof.: Bock ur Ange r. 5 J. FORENS IC PSYCHJ ATRY 37 1 ( 199-1-)
(c h::d lengin g the val idity of the sy ndrome) . Cys tkopf"s history does not support the official diagnosis of
··Intermittent Explosive Disord er· · because there were not multiple epi sodes of disproporti onately
'iiol ent outbursts. See DSM-IV, supro note :2.\ . at 609-1:2.
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history of Cystkopf's long- and short-term relations with his wife; (3) a detailed
account of Cystkopf's usual behavior in a variety of usual and unusual contexts,
including stressful and conftictual situations; (4) the statistically normative
behavioral abnormalities, especially violent conduct, exhibited by people with
Cystkopf's alleged neurological and neuropsychological abnormalities; and (5)
the percentage of those with Cystkopf's pathological lesions and test results
who demonstrate no behavioral abnormalities in general and no abnormal
violence in particular.
The three most important speculations concern the causal role of the cyst in
the homicidal behavior, the validity of Damasio's theory in general, and the
application of Damasio's theory to Cystkopf in particular. These are speculative
for a number of reasons. First, there is no way to confirm that the cyst played a
but-for causal role, especially because we have no evidence that this apparently
lifelong abnormality ever produced any other untoward conduct. Moreover, we
do know both that most people with such cysts do not engage in homicidal
behavior and that many people without abnormalities uncharacteristically "lose
it" on a single occasion and do dreadful things. Second, Damasio's theory
suffers from a number of defects, including vague formulation, limited experimental verification, and unknown ecological validity. Third, even if valid,
Damasio's theory and findings may not apply to Cystkopf, because he differs
importantly from Damasio's exp-erimental subjects. 25
Despite the large gaps in the factual, scientific, and clinical evidence, I will
make the following simplifying assumptions, which are all sympathetic to
Cystkopf's excusing claim: ( l) Cystkopf killed his wife intentionally, but in a
state of extreme emotional disturbance for which his wife's provocative behavior may have been a reasonable explanation or excuse; 26 (2) Cystkopf and his
wife had a generally harmonious relationship that was not a dormant but
pressure-filled "volcano," ready to erupt if the pressure increased; (3) Cystkopf
was a characteristically even-tempered person, not given to rages and other
highly emotional responses to stresses and provocations; (4) despite the cautions of the "method skeptics," 27 all the neuropsychological findings are valid;
(5) Damasio's theory is correct in general; and (6) Cystkopf had im paired
ability to mark the appropriate responses to conflictual situations. The lack of
infom1ation that generated the need for these simplifying assumptions is paradoxically beneficial. It allows us to consider the appropriate role of the neurological
claim unclistracted by facts th at might undermine it and our consequent willing-

25. The differences arc discussed infi·o note 44 and accompanying text.
26. This is consistent with New York's definition of murder in the second degree. \Vith which
Cystkopf was charged. See N.Y. PE:~ -\I LAw ~ i 25.25 (Me Kinney 1987 & Supp. 1996 ).
27. For the most thoroughly skeptical and complete critique. sec D.·\VID FAUST ET AI .. , BR .-'.1';
0.-'.~IAGE CLAili!S: COPING WITH NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE ( 1991 ). Sa also Jeffery T. Barth eta!. ,
Forensic NeuropsYcholog_\'.' A ReplY to the /v!ethod Skeptics, 2 NEUROPSYCH. REV. 251 ( 1992) (admitting
problems with neuropsychological methods and findings. but answering :;kcptics).
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ness to understand the relevance of such claims in general. Now, how sho uld we
assess Cystkopf 's moral and legal responsibility for killing hi s wife?
Cystkopf is not claiming that he was unconscio us or suffering from so-called
sane or insane automatism when he killed his wife. Th at is, he is neither
denying the act requirement of the ptima faci e case, nor is he raising essentially
the same claim as an affi rmati ve defense. 2 s The killer, Cystkopf, was not a
mechanism, that is, literally phy sic ally compelled to perform the bodily movements that caused hi s wife's death. His deed was conscious, intenti onal, and
motivated by reasons for action. Moreover, highly unusual and extreme provocation that creates extreme emotional disturbance and is the but-for cause of
responsive behavior does not fumish a compulsion excuse. At most, as Cystkopf's charge reflects , it provides a partial excusing condition that reduces the
degree of homicide. Any possible full y excusing condition will thus require
analysis of his reasons for action and whether that action was either sufficientl y
irrational or otherwise sufficien tly co mpelled.
Given our assumptions, Cystkopf's reason for killing hi s wife appears relatively apparent. 29 Unusually provoked and enraged by their argument and by
her assaultive scratching, he desired her death and formed the intention to
effectuate his desire. The only unu sual aspect of his behavior, of course, is that
he acted on the desire to kill. Intense rage and the desire to kill or destroy the
objects of our rage are hardly unu sual. In response to such feelings and urges,
people may utter angry words, perform sub-homicidal ac tions, or sometimes
co nsciously or unconsciously turn their anger towards themselves in various
direct and indirect ways. They se ldo m kill, however. Cystkopf surely experienced such feelings in hi s four decades of ad ulthood prior to the homicide,
possibly on many occasions, but he never assau lted those who enraged him. It is
reasonable to assume that, like most people, Cys tkopf used various tec hniques
to avoid turn ing antisocial desire into anti social action. Amo ng these would be
his internal moral sense, his conscience, and his fear of variou s external
sanc ti ons. 3 0
Cystkopf faced an unusual challenge and fa iled. Peoples' repertoires for
fly ing straight vary within and amo ng people from time to time. Some people
have more of the right stuff that operates as a defense to antisoc ial conduct, and

28 . Perh aps C ystkopf sho uld have c laim ed tha t he did no t 8C t. argu ing th at inte nse rage produced a
d issociati ve state of automati sm. Cf Ke ith R ix & Alan C lark so n. Dep e rsono liz.ation und Int ent, 5 J.
Fo RENSI C P SYC I!I r\TRY 409 ( 1994) (prese nti ng a case poss ibl y like Cystk opf's and suggest ing that
automati sm o r in sa nity is th e a ppro priate defe nse) . To address thi s iss ue full y requires mo re k now ledge
than we po ssess o f C ys tk opf s me ntal sta te a t th e time o f th e homicide.
29. In wh a t follows. I do no t mean to ex hau st the e ntire rang e of poss ible ex pla na ti o ns for
Cys tkopf' s behavior or all poss ible infere nces that mi ght be draw n from th e ev idenc e. The goal is to
apply th e prope r conceptual fra mework fm rhink i ng ab o ut th e case. with in wh ich diffe re nt arg uments
c an o f c o urse be m ade.
30. See gene ra/h· Ste phe n J. M orse. Cu lpo/;ili!Y ond Conrrul. 142 U . PA. L. REv. 15 8 7. 1605 - 10
( 1994) (di sc uss in g usual mea ns people use to "ll y straight' ' ).
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situational variables can either reinforce or weaken the characteristic level of
the right stuff. In addition, different situations exert differential criminogenic
effect by providing greater or lesser opportunities for offending. People with
less of the right stuff who face more criminogenic situations will find it harder
to fly straight than people with more of the right stuff who face fewer challenging situations.
But all people, including those with little of the right stuff and those consistently exposed to the strongest challenges to flying straight, are nonetheless held
responsible if they possess the capacity for rational conduct and their conduct is
not compelled. Even if Cystkopf had never before been so provoked and
enraged and even if the homicide would not have occurred but for the unique
circumstances, he should be held responsible unless he lacked the capacity for
rational conduct, that is, the ability to be guided by good reasons. Simply to
conclude that he is not responsible because he had a biological abnormality and
because he acted so seemingly uncharacteristically begs precisely the question
of capacity that we must now address.
'Ne have assumed that Cystkopf had impaired capacity properly to mark the
appropriate response to situations he confronted and that this impairment made
it difficult for him to guide hi s conduct appropriately in conflictual situations.
He may have had lots of other types of the right stuff, but to some degree he
lacked this type. In hi s case, the impairment was apparently caused by biological abnormalities, but the causal story is of little relevance per se. Suppose the
same impairment were caused by an unfortunate chi ldhood or by situational
stress in an otherwise entirely normal person. The moral and legal issue would
be the same.
The real question is whether this impairment undermines rationality sufficie ntly to excuse the agent. To answer it, we must consider Damasio 's theory in
more detail. The "somatic marker " theory attempts to account in part for
functional, socially advantageo us human interaction that takes place in timepressured, conflictual situations. In such cases, there is seldom ti me for the
luxury of complete cost-benefit analysis of all the positive and negative reasons
for alternative co urses of action. To help guide our behavioral responses efficiently to charged social situations, the intact person has affective as well as
cognitive reactions. Having the right emotional reactions automatically sets
neural mechanisms in motion that signal prior punishment and reward experiences to our higher-order control systems. As a result, "the consequences of
puni shment and reward can be experienced co nsciously as 'feelings' and ·ernotions. ' " 3 1 When a soc ial situation reactivates the previou sly learned somatic
states that mark berulVioral responses,
[t]hey mark unambiguou sly not o nly the valu e of current perceptions, but
most importantly, the value of certain outcomes to given courses of acti on ....
31. Damasio et al.. ln dil ·iduols. supra note 18. at 83.
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Somatic states provide an automated way for the brain to select, consciously
and not consciously, among respo nse options. On the one hand, it would link
a given response option with both the pleasure that it may bring immediately,
and the punishment that it will lead to in the fu ture. By forcing attention on a
conflict, a pertinent somatic marker would signal the ultimately deleterious
consequences that might arise from a response that might nonetheless bring
immediate reward .32

This neural repertoire permits the person consciously to suppress negative
responses in favor of more advantageous alternatives, and equally important, it
induces "non-conscious inhibition of excitatory subcortical neurotransmitter
systems which mediate appetitive behaviors." 33 People with an impaired marking system may be fully capable of reasoning correctly about even subtle
hypothetical social problems presented verbally. But in conftictual, timepress ured situations, an impaired marking system increases the probability of
choosing a disadvantageous or dysfunctional response because the agent lacks
the emotional information that helps more fortunately endowed people fly
straight. 34
Even stripped of the neural details , it is perfectly plausible to assume that
having the right emotional responses to situations eases the task of behaving
appropriately or functionally. 35 This assumption is fully consistent with our
view of ourselves as creatures who are capable of rational practical reasoning.
Nothing in the concepts of rationality and practical reasoning suggests that
emotions are not appropriate components of rational action. We rarely have time
and probably few have the ability ever to be entirely cool, fully logical
reasoners. Nature surely has provided us with a " down and dirty " set of

32. !d.
33. ld

34. Damasio 's th eory cou ld be characterized as a psychophys iological account of '' impulsi vity.··
Thi s charac terizati on has the desirable feature of permitting us to relate Damas io 's work to much other
theori zing and research that hypothesizes a posi ti ve causal relation between impul sivity and criminal or
other socially disadvantageous beha vior. See. e.g .. l'v!ICH;\EL R. GOTTFREDSON & TRAVIS HIRSCHI, A
GE!\ERAL TH EORY OF CRI:Vt E 85 -1 20 ( 1990) (ex pl aining theory that lack of self-con trol ca n lead to
crimin al behav ior) . Although the assoc iation between steep time di scounting and maladapti ve conduct
seem s intuitively plausible, there arc probl ems with the concept of impul sivity. Sec JAN VOLc\VKA ,
NEUROI3IOLOGY OF VtOLEi\'CE 180-81 ( 1995) (explaining theory of impulse control and noting that it is
not uniform ly defined); William G. McCown & Philip A. DeSimo ne. Impulses. !mpulsivirr. and
Impulsive Behaviors: A Hist orical Revie\\' of' a Cont emporary Issu e. in TH E li'v!PULSIV E CLI ENT: THEORY,
RESE.-\ RCH , AND TR EATMENT 3, S (Willi am G. McCown et al. eds. , 1993). For the purpose of argument,
however, let us assume th at impul sivity is one sensib le and less '"jargony " term to char3cteri ze the
probl em of people with somatic marking defic its.
35. Although Damas io·s theory co n cern~ the effect of frontal lobe damage on the ability to
experience app ropri ate emotions at all. I also presume that the marking syst em is impaired if a perso n
has learned inappropriate markers. For exa mpl e. there are people who appear to fe e l relati ve ly
una ll oyed pleasure when they anti cipate the intlicti on of sufferin g. pain , or puni shment. A contlicwal
situation might full y activate the markers of such people. bu t the probability of choos in g a socially
di sadvant ageous response wou ld increase. just as it does in people with dimini shed somatic markers.
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techniques for speedy, generally successful, real-time action choices, 36 and the
ability to experience and to use one 's own emotional data is credibly one of
them. Some might prefer to conceptualize the consequences of somatic marking
problems as "volitional" or as problems with the "will," but there is usually
nothing wrong with an impulsive agent's executory ability to translate desires,
beliefs, and intentions into action. Self-control problems of volitionally unimpaired agents are better understood as rationality defects. 37 For example, it is
precisely the lack of the ability properly to use emotional data that allegedly
accounts for the so-called "psychopath's" propensity for anti social conduct and
seeming inability to learn from negative consequences. Psychopaths, however,
do not have volitional problems. I shall therefore discuss Cystkopf's responsibility in terms of rationality.
Before addressing the normative consequences of assuming that Damasio's
theory is true and that Spyder Cystkopf had impaired emotional responses in ,
conftictual, real-world situations, it is necessary to make a few further assumptions. The capacity properly to mark responses somatically, to experience the
right emotional data, like virtually all human capacities, is surely distributed
along a continuum among human beings. We don't know the shape of the curve,
but it is reasonable to assume that some people have maximal capacity, others
have none or almost none, and most people are somewhere in between. And,
presumably, there is an inverse relation between the degree of marking impairment and , to use Damasio's terms, the "adequacy and speed of response
selection. " 38 It is conceivable, of course, but implausible, that this is a binary,
all-or-none capacity. Assume further that a wide range of variables, including,
inter alia, genetic defects, faulty conditioning, and traum a can produce the
impairment. Finally, let us plausibly assume that the somatic marking mechani sm is not the only intrapersonal variable that affects the probability that agents
will choose socially advantageous actions. If an agent's other capacities that
guide action are reasonably intact, then the right respon se may not be so
dit1icult to achieve after all. Indeed, awareness of defects that render the agent a
potentially loose cannon on the deck may enable the agent to adopt compensatory coping mechanisms that mitigate or even obviate the defect. We are now
ready to address properly Cystkopf's responsibility.
Remember that the capacity for rationality is a precondition for moral and
legal responsibility. Discussion of Cystkopf's responsibility must therefore
begin with the prior, entirely normative question of whether and how much the
ability to experience the right emotions in conflictual and potentially conflictual
situations is a criterion of rationality. For example, many consider psychopaths

36. See DANI EL C. DENNETT . D ,.\RWIN's D ANG EROUS IDEA: E VOI.UTION AN D T il E fYIEANII': GS OF LIFE
505-10 ( 1995 ) (s ugges ting th at e thi cal refl ec ti o n o n courses of ac ti o n mu st pro v ide mech a ni sms for
··bru te"' a nd " a-rati o na l" ' termin a ti o n o f re fl ec ti o n).
37 . Morse, supra no te 30. at 1595-605. So me cases of lac k uf se lf-co nt rol do s te m from vo liti o nal
de fec ts, but mos t do no t. ld at 1597-98 .
38 . Dam.asio et al.. lndil'idu a/s. s upm note IS. at 82 .
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to be inational, even though psyc hopaths cognitively comprehend the facts
about the world, including the legal rules and their consequences. Purely
cognitive knowledge, divorced from its emotional context, is allegedly insufficient for moral rationality. The psychopath is "morally insane." 39 Others
disagree, claiming, for example , that psychopaths are rational and should be
4
held responsible unless they lack selfish fee lings, which is unlikely. ° Cunent
criminal law holds psychopaths responsible, despite the arguments that such
people lack moral rationality. 41
Understanding the proper way to assess Cystkopf's responsibility requires
on ly that we appreciate the normati ve nature of the relation between a particular
impairment, ho wever it is cau sed, and the moral and legal conception of
rationality. If one believes that unimpaired marking is not a criterion of reasonable rationality, then Cystkopf 's claim for excuse is immediately blocked: If his
impairment does not negate the capacity for rational conduct, there is no moral
or legal purchase for hi s claim. Cystkopf's condition raises a colorable claim
only if we decide that impaired marking mechani sms undermine rationality. But
we need not resolve the debate. Instead, let us assume for the purpose of
discussion that somatic marking is relevant to our conception of rati onality.
The next issue to be investigated would be Cystkopf 's total capaci ty for
rational conduct, considering all hi s cognitive and affective repertoires, including his marking capacities. We would want to know as much as possible about
his real-world behavior in a variety of contexts, in addition to the medical and
psychological findings. Rationality and responsibility are moral and legal , not
medical or psychological, issues. The Jaw's central concern is how Cystkopf
performs in the real world, not th e structure of hi s brain or how he performs on
various tests .
Medical and psychological findin gs would provide rel atively direct ev idence
abo ut moral and legal criteria only if they are excellent prox ies fo r such
standards. They are not good proxies , however, and are unlikely ever to be.
Moral and legal criteria are matters of normative meaning, and it is fanciful to
assume that there will be a perfec t match, uniform among people, between
discrete brain states and normati ve meanings concerning human action. Nevertheless, abnormal clinical , laboratory, and psychological test findings may add
plausibility to claims concerning impairments in the capacity for rational conduct in natural contexts, especiall y if they can provide reasonably precise

39. See, e.g., Susan Wolf, Saniry and !he .M eraphrsi cs of Responsibility, in RESPOi\S IBILITY, CHARACTER, ,\N D THE E~·IOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MOR,\L PSYCHOLOGY 46, 58 (Ferdin and Schoeman ed., 1987) .
40 . See. e.g., Samuel H. Pill sbu ry. Th e ivfeaning of Deserved Punishm ent: An Essay on Cho ice,
Character and Responsibilitv, 67 IND . LJ. 719. 746-47 ( 1992) (argu ing that on ly psyc hopaths who lack
selfi sh fee lin g should be exc used from crimina l respo nsibility) .
~~ I. See. e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE ~ 4.0 I (2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) ('' fT ]he terms ' men tal
di se ase or defect ' do not include an abn orma lity manifested only by repeated crimina l or otherwise
antisoc ial cond uct." ). It is interesti ng. as Damasio himself rea lizes, that psyc hopaths and nonpsychopathi c crimina ls respond si milarl y to experimental procedures li ke hi s. Dr\MASIO . DESCA RTES' ERROR,
supra note 18, at 288.
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estimates of a person's performance on relevant tasks that would permit comparison to people in general. They may, therefore , be relevant, provided they are
reliable and valid.
Intelligence tests present a classic, if controversial, example. People whose
general behavior demonstrates obviously superior intelligence have no purely
cognitive problem understanding moral and legal rules, and we need no I.Q. test
to identify such people. In contrast, people with severe and profound developmental disabilities lack the cognitive ability fully to understand the rules and, once
again, we need not test them to know this. Suppose, howe ver, a defendant of
limited intelligence claims that he did not appreciate the criminality or wrongfulness of his conduct and, in capital cases, that he does not deserve to die, even if
he were criminally responsible. To support this claim, he offers evidence of his
performance on a standard general intelligence test, which indicates that he
scores in the bottom two percent of the population and has a mild or moderate
developmental disability. This finding would not be dispositive on the issue of
criminal responsibility or on death penalty mitigation in those states that
(m isguidedly) permit execution of developmentally disabled people. As the
Supreme Court properly recognized, people with the same level of intellectual
impairment can have different moral capacities. 4 2 But the test result would
surely be relevant and equally surely should be admissible.
T hus, even if the science employed to gather medic al and psychological
findings is reliable and valid, such findings would still be inaccurate proxies for
moral and legal criteria for respon sible action. To illustrate furt her, su ppose
Cystkopf's medical and psyc hologi cal findings one month before the homicide
wou ld have been indi stinguishabl e from what they were at the time of the
crime. Indeed, because all the findin gs we re obtained after the homicide, the
defen se experts ' opinions abo ut Cystkopf's condition at the time of the crime
imply that they believe the results wou ld have been the same or even less
abnormal on the clay of the killing because the tumor was al!egediy growing.
Suppose further that Cystkopf had a heated argument with his wife or had some
other conflictual interactio n a month before the crime, as he may well have had.
It is reasonable to infer that on the prior occ asion he chose the right response
even though his abnormal neurological and psychological condition was measurab ly the same as on the day of the killing. Despite the presence of the same
ab normai findings, no one would consider Cystkopf not respons ible for the right
response, and he would properly be prai:;ed for doi ng the ri ght thing.
The impre ss ive theori zin g and extensive med ic al and psychological find ings
abo ut Cystkopf are unlikely to provide precise dnta concerning the level of his
irnpairment in the capacity for rational conduct. T here is no quantitative scale
with which to compare him to normal or abnormal populations. A ll we know is
tha t there is some defect of indeterminate rea l-wo rld effect. Although the
uncharacteri stic homicidal behavi or was not inconsistent with the defect, we
-~2.

Sa Penry v. Lynaugh . ..1.9:2 U.S . 302. 338 i! 98 0).
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cannot even be sure that the defect played a causal role in the conduct. Opinions
that it did or that it did not are both speculations, not confirmed scientific or
clinical fact. Opinions based on the theory and findings that Cystkopf did or did
not appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct, or that it was or was not
impossible for him to do so, are similarly speculative, not fact. Indeed, these are
moral and legal conclusions, rather than clinical or scientific opinions.
Let us review. Spyder Cystkopf's capacity for rational conduct on the day he
killed his wife is the crucial issue. It is relevant but not dispositive that he had
an abnormality that may have affected thi s capacity. Medical and psychological
evide nce may help us decide if his capacity was affected, but it is not very
precise evidence about incapacity, and it is surely not dispositive of the legal
lS SUe .

How can the average juror or judge decide whether Cystkopf was criminally
responsible ? Although the avail able case material is fru stratingly incomplete,
jurors at the actual trial would surely ha ve copious evidence concerning Cystkopf's relevant behavioral hi story. T hey would have to judge in li ght of the
circumstances of the crime, Cystkopf's full hi story, and the medical and psychological findings, whether Cystkopf's capacity fo r rational conduct was so
impaired at the time of the crime that he substantially lacked the capac ity to
appreciate the wrongfulne ss or criminality of hi s conduct. This is a normative,
moral, and legal judgme nt they would make using common sen se inferen ces
about Cystkopf based on the evidence presented to them . vVhat more could we
ask or want of jurors?
Even with the inadequate data about Cystkopf and his hi story that we
possess, we can make some observations that are relevant to deciding whether
Cystkopf is responsible for killing his w ife . First and foremost alt hough the
defense experts agreed that Cystkopf had the cyst th rougho ut hi s life , he had
never engaged in any previous violent conduct. T hi s suggests, but does nor
prove , that any behavioral effects the cyst produced did not previously reduce
hi s capacity for rational conduct in ge neral or predispose him to vi olence or
other dysfunctional sociai be havior. There are, however, at least three possible
responses to this sugge sti on. First, the grow in g cyst produced increasing but
unrecogn ized effects, which ultimately achieved a leve l that impaired his capacity for rationa1ity ...u Second , he had never before been as provoked and enraged
as he was by his wife on the day of the crin1.e. and thus hi s ge nerally imp<~ire d
capacity for rationality had ne ve r bee n so sorely chall enged . Third, both the
cys t' s effects may have worsened an d the prov ocati on may have uniquely tested
him.
The behav ioral history we ha ve th us permits contrary interpretat ions of the
crime . Cystkopf 's pacifi c past su ggests that hi s capac ity for rat ion al condu ct
was not terribl y impaired. Dreadfull y provoked by his wife, however, he lost hi s

-1.3. Aga in. the lesi on did not specific ally ztn u unmdiateuly pruducc homi cid al intent ions ur the
intent to vi olate a provision of the Ne'.\' York Penal Code . Se e S IIJ!m tex t accompanying notes I0- ! .i.
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temper and overreacted homicidally, as many normal people unfortunately do.
If this is the right story, he should rightfully be convicted of second degree
murder. On the other band, the killing is so uncharacteristic that perhaps it was
the consequence of a uniquely unfortunate coincidence of worsening neuropathology and extreme provocation, which together reduced his capacity for rationality sufficiently to find him not responsible. Before deciding which of these two
accounts is more likely accurate, we would want to know much more about
Cystkopf's relationship with his wife, his history of responding to stress, and
the circumstances of the crime.
The Damasio theory and findings also point in opposite directions. Cystkopf
perhaps had brain pathology similar to the pathology of Damasio's subjects, and
he did have experimental results on somatic marking tests that were similar to
the results of the experimental subjects. Assuming the validity of Damasio's
theory- a large assumption-this suggests that Cystkopf's capacity for rationality was impaired, at least on one plausible account of the content of rationality.
On the other hand, Damasio's subjects seemed to have somewhat different brain
pathology and exhibited marked personality changes after suffering brain damage, including dysfunctional social behavior and sociopathy. 44 Cystkopf, who
showed no such changes, was apparently different from Damasio's subjects,
despite his similar scores on the marking procedure. Again, although the
sub-arachnoid cyst had been present for decades and probably for his entire life,
it is possible that the most severe effects of the brain damage occmTed only at
the time of the crime. Two other, more parsimonious inferences are perhaps
more likely, however. Cystkopf may have learned techniques or possessed other
capacities to compensate for his somatic marking defect. Or, hi s brain damage
may have been different from Damasio's subjects, and marking defects may be
a substantial problem only if they occur in people with brain damage like
Damasio's subjects. Cystkopf's excusing claim is strengthened if the cyst did
impair his somatic marking and capacity for rationality at the time of the crime.
In the alternative, if Cystkopf was relevantly diffe rent from Damasio's subjects
or if he was able to compensate for hi s alleged marking defect, his excusmg
claim is weakened.
Until we ha ve more evidence about Cystkopf, we can go no furth er.
VII.

CoNCLUSION

An analysis of moral and legal responsibility must begin with a normative
theory of and criteria for excusing conditions. Assessment of responsibility in
individual cases requires patient, cautiou s attention to all the evidence logically
44. Damasio e t al., Individuals. supra note 18, at 8 1-82, 85. Dam as io' s use of the diagnostic term
"sociopathy'· is odd, beca use the Amer ican Psyc hiat ric Assoc iation does no t e mpl oy thi s te rm in its
official diagn os tic manual. It does inc lude "Anti soc ial Pe rso nality Disorde r," to which Damas io
appears to be refe rring. See DSM-IY. supra note 23. at 645-50. Damasio docs not indicate whether any
o f hi s ex perime ntal subj ec ts me t the full diag nos tic c rit e ria for thi s d isorder, and he does no t pro vide
sufficient data to permit readers to ma ke a n independent judgment.
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and empirically relevant to the presence of genuine excusing conditions. Only if
one understands the theory and criteria for excuse, however, can one fully
appreciate what evidence is relevant and why.
The case of Spyder Cystkopf is a perfectly generalizable example of the
thesis. Causes of behavior are not excuses per se. Even confirmed causal
physical pathology does not excuse human action unless it produces an independent excusing condition. The focus, then, must be on whether at the time of the
crime an individual lacked the capacity for rationality. In Cystkopf's case, his
sub-arachnoid cyst and perhaps related neuropsychological defects were relevant to assessing his capacity, but they were only a part of the puzzle. And they
were relevant not just because they may have played a causal role, but because
they may have affected his capacity for rationality.

